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Abstract—This paper presents PULSAR, a framework for pre-
empting Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). PULSAR employs
a probabilistic graphical model (specifically a Factor Graph)
to infer the time evolution of an attack based on observed
security events at runtime. The framework (i) learns the statistical
significance of patterns of events from past attacks; (ii) composes
these patterns into FGs to capture the progression of the attack;
and (iii) decides on preemptive actions. The accuracy of our
approach and its performance are evaluated in three experiments
at SystemX: (i) a study with a dataset containing 120 successful
APTs over the past 10 years (PULSAR accurately identifies
91.7%); (ii) replaying of a set of ten unseen APTs (PULSAR stops
8 out of 10 replayed attacks before system integrity violation, and
all ten before data exfiltration); and (iii) a production deployment
of the framework (during a month-long deployment, PULSAR
took an average of one second to make a decision).
Index Terms—Factor Graphs, Attack Preemption
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are among the most
sophisticated attacks targeting networked systems [1]. Instead
of exploiting a single vulnerability, an APT consists of
several stages: an attacker (i) gains unauthorized access to
a network, (ii) uses multiple attack vectors to pursue objectives
repeatedly [2]–[4], and (iii) remains undetected for extended
periods of time by staying under the radar of monitors [5].
Network and host security monitors [6] generate security events
in APTs that often overlap with legitimate user activities. These
result in high false positive rates (FPR) [7], [8] by threat
detection software (TDS) [9] and security information and
event management tools (SIEM) [10].
Despite the deployment of TDS/SIEM in large networks,
successful attacks occur because security events by themselves
(particularly if considered in isolation) are not sufficient
indicators of malicious behavior or its progression. Often,
system integrity has already been compromised (e.g., a rootkit
is already installed) or data have been exfiltrated [11], [12] by
the time a critical event occurs. Today, such critical events can
only be handled by a nimble team of experienced analysts [13]
using forensics and provenance tools [14], [15] among others.
While these tools are useful, analysts still rely on their domain
knowledge and learned (based on past security incidents)
data characteristics (e.g., repetitiveness, severity, and common
patterns of events) together, with the ongoing observation of
events to investigate or respond to attacks.
The goal of this paper is to preemptively stop APTs with
minimal false positives and low performance overhead. We
use machine learning to fuse domain knowledge, experience of
past attacks, and real-time observations from security monitors
to detect and preempt an ongoing attack. We demonstrate this
approach (PULSAR) in a production environment with real data
from a large-scale, high-performance computing infrastructure
that has thousands of nodes and both academic and industrial
users (anonymized under the name SystemX). The specific
approach is based on probabilistic graphical models (PGM),
particularly Factor Graphs (FG). The probabilistic nature of the
model captures the uncertainty in (a) handling incomplete
data and, (b) handling the significance of an event under
different circumstances (as shown in §IV). In addition, FGs
allow us (i) to capture temporal relationships among observed
events, (ii) to build compositional models from the captured
relationships to allow for machine interpretability, and (iii) to
use the above information to form scalable real-time inference
strategies so as to preempt attacks. We assert that FGs are a
suitable formulation for modeling security attacks, because FGs
model conditional dependencies and provide mechanisms to
incorporate domain knowledge, while operating on modest data
sizes (e.g., N = 120 attacks in this paper) with class imbalance.
FGs are suitable for security analysis because successful attacks
are rare (e.g., they represent only 0.01% of events in SystemX’s
daily operation). An important benefit of FGs in contrast to
provenance models [14], [15] is that relationships between
sequences of security events and attack stages can be modeled
statistically from historical data, and no assumptions are made
about the causal ordering among events.
Contributions. The key contributions of this paper are:
(i) An FG to model the progress of APTs targeting networked
systems with thousands of nodes. (ii) A method to learn FG
from annotated real-word attacks in which 99.7% of the data is
annotated automatically. (iii) A testbed for testing ten attacks
unseen at SystemX in the presence of legitimate traffic. (iv) A
comprehensive runtime and accuracy evaluation.
Evaluation. We demonstrate PULSAR’s accuracy and per-
formance via three experiments. First, we evaluated PULSAR
on 120 real APTs observed in the past 10 years at SystemX.
The dataset contains a variety of APTs that use different
types of attack vectors, exploits, and payloads. When we
trained PULSAR on one half of the historical attacks (60
out of 120 APTs) and tested it on the other half, PULSAR
accurately identified 91.7% APTs prior to data loss. Second,
to test its generalizability, we trained PULSAR on the entire
historical dataset of 120 known APTs and tested it on ten
APTs, unseen at SystemX. The unseen APTs, described in
Table IV, are based on top ten attack techniques described
in the IBM Threat Intelligence Index [2]. In order to have
realistic attack scenarios, the unseen APTs were injected into
live traffic where background events intermingled with attack
events. PULSAR successfully stopped eight out of the ten
unseen APTs before system integrity violation and all the
APTs before data loss. Third, PULSAR was integrated into
SystemX’s security infrastructure for a month-long deployment.
During this period, there were an average of 94,238 events per
day. PULSAR filtered this stream of events to an average of
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Table I: Listing of attack stages σi ∈ S.
Stage Name Description/Example
σ0 Benign Legitimate uses of the target system
σ1 Discovery Scan for open ports or applications
σ2 Initial Access Remote login into the target system
σ3 Gathering Reading kernel version
σ4 Command & Control Receiving attacker commands
σ5 Preparation Obtaining and compiling exploits
σ6 Persistence Installation of backdoor
σ7 Lateral Movement Accessing internal hosts
σ8 Defense Evasion Purging attack traces
σ9 Collection Recording secret keys or passwords
σ10 Exfiltration Using covert channels to extract secrets
1,885 significant events that it performed inference on at an
average rate of one second per event.
Putting PULSAR in Perspective. While traditional SIEMs
can output events of related attack vectors, such events
often overwhelm security analysts [15]–[18]. Anomaly-based
techniques (e.g., [19]–[21]) have potential to capture novel
APTs, but they require extensive observations of normal
usage profiles to detect anomalous activities, and also need
substantial tuning to minimize FPR. Recent provenance-based
techniques [15], [22] aim to build dependency graphs of APTs,
however, these techniques require a complete causal observation
of an APT and may be more suitable for offline analysis [14].
Our approach is unique in that i) it makes no assumptions
about the causal ordering among events, and ii) it is trained
and validated on both longitudinal and live production traffic.
II. OVERVIEW
A. Preliminaries
Definition 1. A security event (also referred to as an event)
et ∈E is a variable that represents an observation of a potentially
malicious activity at a time t using one or more security-related
log messages from a TDS/SIEM. The set E = {ε1, . . .εm}
contains 105 possible values of events indicating APT activities
found in both SystemX and other similar systems [23].
Definition 2. An attack stage st ∈ S represents the progression
of an APT at time t. The set S = {σ0, . . .σn−1} contains n
possible values of attack stages. This paper adopts the MITRE
classification [3] that defines n = 11 stages (see Table I)
commonly found in APTs in the wild. Publicly disclosed
APTs [5] follow these attack stages and have been used in
prior work on APTs [22].
B. Severity, Repetitiveness & Commonality
The key challenge for a security analyst is to identify an
event or a set of events that are good indicators of an APT
before it has caused any damage. To characterize known APTs,
we analyze a longitudinal dataset (2008–present) of 120 security
incidents at SystemX. Our dataset includes (i) human-written
incident reports that indicate the users and the machines
involved in the incident, (ii) raw logs of both legitimate user
activities and attack activities, i.e., network flows (generated by
a cluster of Bro network security monitors (NSM) [6]), system
logs (generated by rsyslog,osquery, and ossec [10]), and
(iii) audit logs of system calls (generated by auditd). These raw
logs contain detailed attack activities. For each log message, we
wrote scripts to remove specific (e.g., personal information [24],
[25] or IP addresses) and non-deterministic information (e.g.,
time) and keep only the event in E in the form of a symbolic
Oct 09 Oct 23 Nov 06 Nov 20
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
D
ai
ly
ev
en
ts
Figure 1: SystemX’s monitors observe an average of 94,238
events per day (standard deviation = 23,547) in Oct–Nov 2018.
name. For example, download_sensitive denotes a download
of a file with a sensitive extension, e.g., .c, from an arbitrary
node at any time. We assert that our dataset captures variants
of known APTs and generalizes to unseen APTs (see §V).
In our dataset of 235K events, a majority of events (99.7%)
have been automatically annotated with corresponding attack
stages. These events are clearly benign (e.g., login) or clearly
malicious (e.g., installation of a binary file in an existing
malware database). Only a small fraction (0.3%) of events (i.e.,
ones that appear in both attack and legitimate activities) cannot
be annotated automatically. We consulted with several security
experts to annotate the remaining events. While we assume
that the annotations by security experts are correct, i.e., attack
events are labeled as malicious, we can reuse a body of work
in ML that addresses annotation accuracy [26], [27]. Below
we discuss the main characteristics of our dataset on APTs.
Severity. Severe events can be used to detect successful
APTs; however, they cannot be used to preempt attacks
because their occurrences indicate that the system integrity
has already been compromised and that data have already been
exfiltrated [28]. In fact, the entire dataset has 19 such unique
critical events which occur 98 times in the 120 APTs. In all
cases those critical events were detected when it was too late to
preempt the system integrity loss. On the other hand, if any of
events was considered as an indicator of a complete APT then
analysts would have to analyze all of low- and medium-severity
events (e.g., 94K daily events observed at SystemX in Fig. 1).
Commonality. Another way of identifying APTs is to look
at characteristics shared by already known and new APTs,
e.g., the longest common subsequence (LCS) [29] of events
that lead up to malicious activity. For example, in Fig. 2a, we
observe that 95% of the attacks in our dataset share at most
33.3% of their events. These events correspond to common
attack vectors for establishing a foothold in the target network
before executing exploits to exfiltrate secrets. Fig. 2b shows the
histogram of 45 LCS (S1–S45) identified in our dataset. The
histogram indicates that LCSs have common patterns across
multiple attacks - which can be learnt.
Repetitiveness. APTs observed in our dataset (and in the
wild [5]) often start with a set of repetitive but inconclusive
events to identify vulnerable computing resources (e.g., scans
for vulnerable Apache Struts portals [11]). Such repeated events
are themselves not indicators of malicious activity, but can be
used to signal potentially malicious events that need further
monitoring. SystemX observes an average of 80k (out of 94K
in Fig. 1) repeated port and vulnerability scans on a daily basis.
To summarize, use of individual events categorized by only
one of the three data characteristics (i.e., severity, commonality,
or repetitiveness) can detect the presence of an APT, but with
two caveats: (i) the APT is already successful (i.e., the system
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Figure 2: (a) The fractions of similar events between pairs of
APTs in our dataset. (b) The count of LCS in our dataset.
integrity is already lost), or (ii) the FPR is high. We find, in
the historical data at SystemX, that using events categorized
by a single data characteristic can only detect 44% (53 out
of 120) past APTs. Moreover, using individual events resulted
in a high FPR of 87% when using only repetitive events as
indicators of APTs as shown in Fig. 3.
Proposition. We assert that combining events from diverse
monitors with different characteristics and jointly analyzing
(fusing) their statistical significance (likelihood of belonging
to an attack) can lead to a more accurate APT detector that
can effectively preempt attacks.
We show how PULSAR works with a sophisticated attack.
C. Motivating Example: The Attack
The Equifax attack (i) used a remote execution exploit (RCE)
(publicly disclosed as CVE-2017-5638 [30]) to gain access;
(ii) stayed undiscovered in Equifax’s system for an extended
period of time [11]; (iii) extracted 143M Social Security
Numbers. The goal of the attack was to get a shell (terminal) to
control the Struts server without compromising a user’s account.
While the CVE of the remote exploit is publicly known, we
do not have the specifics of steps (ii) and (iii). In our attack,
we used (i) a remote code execution exploit targeting Apache
Struts (CVE-2017-5638, identical to the vulnerability in the
Equifax breach), (ii) a privilege escalation (PE) exploit [31],
(iii) a rootkit that uses port-knocking for stealthy data extraction
using a DNS tunnel. To simulate the attack, we collaborated
with SystemX’s redteam to setup a vulnerable Struts server in a
virtual machine located in a production cluster at SystemX and
launch the attack (i.e., via the RCE) from outside of SystemX.
We collaborated with the SystemX analysts to analyze the
event streams so as to understand their thought process.
While most APTs can take days to run, it would have been
impractical for our attack to disrupt SystemX’s production
systems for an extended period of time. Thus, we ran the attack
for 10 minutes in a 24-hour period while production workloads
were also running. SystemX’s security analysts did not know
the exact time of the attack. While SystemX’s security team had
a range of security analysis and forensic tools to assist in their
investigation, they had to analyze events observed from host
and network security monitors: on that day a total of 97,327
events were observed (black vertical bars in Fig. 4b; some are
omitted for simplicity) out of which only 15 events (shown
as colored bars) were related to the attack. The progression
of our attack is depicted in Fig. 4a. The diamonds, ovals, and
rectangles depict IP addresses, processes, and files, respectively.
The attack progressed as follows.
In the discovery stage, the attack repetitively scanned for
vulnerable Apache Struts portals (i.e., ε1, . . . ,ε4) in Fig. 4b.
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Figure 3: Combination of multiple events (using PULSAR)
provides more accurate detection.
Those scan events did not require immediate action from
SystemX’s operators because a few scans do not lead to
network congestion, and hence such activities were considered
routine. Once a vulnerable Struts server is identified, the attack
gained initial access by exploiting the remote code execution
vulnerability (i.e, ε5) that blends into scan events.
The gathering stage in Fig. 4a illustrates each of the
attacker’s actions with its corresponding UNIX command. In
order to make sure that the system admin was not present,
the attack queried currently active users (i.e., ε6: command
w). The attack obtained the kernel version to prepare for a
suitable exploit (event ε7, command uname). In the preparation
stage, the attacker established a reverse shell to his/her machine
and transferred the source code of the PE exploit (cowroot.c)
and a sophisticated rootkit (knockd.c) to the legacy memory-
mounted disk (/dev/shm; i.e., ε8) to make sure that no attack
traces would be presented on the disk file system.
In the privilege escalation stage, the attacker obtained a
compiler toolchain (ε9: command apt) and compiled (ε10:
command cc) the exploit. Unlike Windows environments in
which malicious binaries can run directly, SystemX uses a
variety of highly customized Linux distributions for different
computing tasks. Thus, attackers could not deploy binaries
directly even if they got the kernel version. In our past
APTs, attackers must compile exploit code for the specific
kernel configuration of the target machine. After executing the
compiled PE exploit, the attacker became the superuser: this
activity corresponded to a severe event (i.e., ε11). If the attack
was not stopped here, the attacker could compile the rootkit
and load (insmod) the rootkit as a kernel module (i.e., ε12).
In the persistence stage, once the kernel module (knockd.ko)
has been loaded, the attacker could maintain persistent access
by using two rootkit components: (i) a user-level backdoor that
listens at port 9090 to receive remote commands, and (ii) a net-
filter kernel hook that provides a stealth port-knocking service
for the user-level backdoor, i.e., the port only opens for a short
period of time upon receiving a specific “knocking” sequence
of three TCP packets such that src_port + seq_number =
1221. Thus, the secret port stays under the radar of network-
security scanning tools (which treat these packets as misrouted
or corrupted). Finally, in the exfiltration stage, the attacker
extracts secret SSH keys (id_rsa) and data (portal.db) by
using a DNS tunnel (iodine; i.e., ε13, . . . ,ε15).
D. Motivating Example: The Defense
We describe the defense from the perspective of an experi-
enced security analyst and show how PULSAR uses machine
learning to automate the detection process.
Assuming that an analyst observes a stream of events (see
Fig. 4), we expect that s/he will focus on three key events. First,
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Figure 4: (a) Attacker’s view of the exercised APT. (b) Defender’s view of detected attack stages and recommended actions.
on observing scans ε1−ε4, the analyst might suspect malicious
intent, but have low confidence that it might mature into an
attack (a few scans seldom lead to a major attack). Second,
the system queries ε6,ε7 increase the analyst’s suspicion. Most
benign users do not query detailed system configurations
(although they might). At this stage, the analyst’s confidence
increases, but not enough to warrant a reaction. As a result, the
decision is to continue to monitor additional events. The third
set of key events is the placement and compilation of the source
file in the memory-mounted disk, i.e., ε8,ε9,ε10. Although these
events may be used in legitimate activity to speed up I/O (e.g.,
an in-memory file system), ε8 is also observed in attacks, as
such volatile storage does not leave any forensic evidence
after system reboot. Finally, the analyst observes ε11, a severe
event corresponding to PE. If the attack is not stopped at this
point, the system integrity will be lost, i.e., the attacker will
get superuser permission. However, one must note that PE is
not always a malicious event. In some contexts (especially on
personal workstations on enterprise networks) ordinary users
might have legitimate reasons to escalate to a superuser, e.g.,
to perform an operating system upgrade.
The above scenario assumes there is an experienced analyst
who can analyze the events in a stream, presumably with
the help of various tools, to make a decision. However,
performing such an analysis in real-time today is generally
impossible, as there are an average of 94K events per day.
Note that our hypothetical analyst made his/her decision based
on (i) repetition of scans, (ii) commonality of the action (since
observed previous incidents involved system configuration
queries), and (iii) severe–critical use of the compilation of
the source code on the volatile file system. In addition,
taken together, the sequence of a scan, followed by system
configuration queries, and the placement and compilation (of
source files) in a memory-mounted disk, is one of the 45
common event sequences in our dataset (see Fig. 2).
We present in this paper a machine-learning based approach,
based on PGM [32]–[38], which builds an FG [33] for each
user, and can perform real-time detection. Our approach learns
from past events to build prior knowledge and uses the learned
domain knowledge of the system together with observed
runtime events. PULSAR can achieve this in the presence of
noisy events, i.e., many users using the system. As each event is
observed, PULSAR adds a factor function (FF) to the event that
characterizes its commonality, severity, or repetitiveness. These
factor functions are learned by extracting events sequences
from our dataset of 120 past APTs. At its core, an FF captures
how frequently is an event (or an event sequence) occurred in
past APTs and the statistical significance. The FFs together
with observed events, are used to infer attack stages, which
allows our decision algorithm to preemptively stop an attack.
PULSAR processes events as follows. First, each of the scan
events ε1−ε4 has an FF attached to it to capture the frequency
and the significance of repetitive scans. This FF indicates that
the attack has not yet met the stopping threshold (i.e., the
attacker is only discovering the system). Then, the attacker
gets a terminal to control the Struts server (event e5). After
that, when PULSAR observes the events query active users
and query kernel version ε6,ε7, it adds FFs to the event to
capture these events severity. The FFs indicate that the events
are not severe, and thus the attack continues to be monitored.
If any observation of this event was stopped, many legitimate
users would be unable to work. Finally, PULSAR observes
the placement and compilation of source code, i.e., ε8− ε10,
which combined with past events (ε6,ε8,ε10) forms a common
sequence. While individual events in this sequence can be
legitimate, the whole sequence has occurred frequently in past
APTs. Now, PULSAR outputs the attack stage as preparation
(immediately before PE) and notifies analysts to stop the attack.
We quantify PULSAR’s preemptive detection capabilities
in terms of: i) preemption before system integrity violation
and before data loss and ii) preemption after system integrity
violation (SI) but before data loss (DL). These metrics can
be quantified in terms of the distance (in hops) calculated by
a function hop(Dσ ,LSI+DL) between Dσ , the stage when an
attack is detected (i.e., stop action is suggested), and LSI+DL,
the actual system integrity violation without any data loss. This
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hop-based metric is time-independent; thus, it can characterize
attacks that happen on various time-scales, e.g., on the order
of minutes, days, or weeks. PULSAR stops the 6-stage APT
above (Fig. 4) at its 3rd stage, i.e., at Dσ = σ5 (preparation),
while the system integrity violation is at LSI+DL = σ6 and
hop(Dσ ,LSI+DL) = 1. Fig. 4b shows that PULSAR infers attack
stages that approach the successful completion of the APT.
Finally, PULSAR’s decision is presented to security analysts.
These decisions could be automated by actuators, e.g., which
could redirect malicious network flows [39]–[42] or allocate
resources for further monitoring [43].
III. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Target system. This paper considers multiuser, multinode,
networked computer systems that provide computational ser-
vices in which users remotely execute workloads on internal
hosts (physical/virtual machines). The system is assumed to be
benign at the onset. The system may have unpatched vulnera-
bilities due to the complexity of patching highly interconnected
system components. Indeed, recent surveys [44], [45] found
that 37% of the top 133k websites still use vulnerable libraries.
We assume that the events from network- and kernel-based
monitors are trustworthy [46]–[55] and accurate in capturing
attack activities. Since our approach’s accuracy depends on
monitors, we use an extensive set of well-configured (e.g.,
SystemX uses a Bro cluster for network monitoring) and well-
protected monitors (e.g., osquery runs at the kernel-level).
While an attacker may tamper with one monitor (on one host)
by using the credential of a local privilege user, it would be
challenging to manipulate all monitors. We describe an example
attack (A2 in §V) that manipulates the Bro cluster to suppress
attack-related security events; however, PULSAR still works.
Attacker Capabilities. This paper assumes that an attacker
can pretend to be a legitimate user by using weak/stolen cre-
dentials [56]–[59] or remote command execution exploits [30]
to compromise internal hosts. PULSAR treats it as a single
attack if (1) an attacker moves laterally (e.g., connects by SSH
to multiple machines) using the same user account and (2)
multiple (coordinated or independent) attackers launch an attack
using the same user account. If (1) an attacker moves laterally
using different user accounts, or (2) one or more attackers use
different entry points and launch attacks using different user
accounts, PULSAR treats that as multiple separate attacks.
An attacker may mimic legitimate user activities [60] to
obfuscate attack-related activities. Such an attack only works
against TDSs that use a small sliding window of events (e.g., 9
events in [61]) to detect an attack. PULSAR uses a larger sliding
window of 10,000 events, and filters insignificant events (§V).
If an attacker fills up PULSAR’s sliding window, PULSAR will
not be able to detect the attack. However, such attack activities
might cause significant perturbations in system operations, and
hence be observable to the operators.
The boundary of our threat model is that PULSAR cannot
preempt an attack if the attacker (e.g., a malicious insider)
executes an attack (i) in a single step without being persis-
tent, (ii) with no time evolution involving prior events, and
(iii) without events in common with any of the past APTs.
Nonetheless, as we showed in our results, our threat model
can capture a wide variety of attacks, as discussed in §VI.
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Figure 5: An example Factor Graph at runtime (from §IV).
IV. LEARNING AND INFERENCE MODEL
This section introduces FGs and demonstrates its advantages
in addressing the threat model.
A. Formulating APT Defence as a FG
Definition 3. A Factor Graph [33] is a graphical representation
of the factor-argument dependencies of a real valued function.
Given the factorization of a function f (x1, . . . ,xn),
f (x1, . . . ,xn) =
1
Z
m
∏
i=0
fi(Xi), where Xi ⊆ {x1, . . . ,xn}
The corresponding FG G(X
⋃
F,A) is a bipartite graph that
consists of variable vertices X = {x1, . . . ,xn}, factor vertices
F = { f1, . . . , fm}, and arcs A= {(xi, f j) | xi ∈X j}. The functions
fi are called factor functions.
Definition 4. An event timeline is a sequence of events Et =
{ei | i ∈ [0, t]}, observed at each time step i until the time t.
We also call such a timeline an event stream.
Definition 5. A attack-stage timeline is a sequence of unknown
stages St = {si | i ∈ [0, t]} corresponding to Et .
PULSAR uses the FG formulation (shown in Fig. 5) to
describe the progression of APT by factorizing the joint
probability distribution (pdf) of Et and St as
P(Et ,St) =
1
Z∏c
fc(Xc), (1)
where Z is a normalization factor that ensures P is probability
distribution. Each set of random variables Xc contains a subset
of events Ec and attack stages Sc such that Et∪St =⋃c(Ec∪Sc).
§IV-B will describe how the attack characteristics (from §II-B)
of severity, commonality and repetitiveness can be encoded
into FFs and the choice of different Xc. The PULSAR FG
makes no assumptions about the causal ordering among events.
This is a fundamental strength of PULSAR compared to other
techniques like provenance techniques [14] as it is difficult to
define the causal ordering of events in realistic attacks.
B. Formulating & Training Factor Functions
The challenges with formulating the FFs for the FG described
above (from (1)) are (a) to find the set Xc by selecting events
from Et and states from St ; and (b) to find a functional form
of fc that relates the variables in Xc. PULSAR’s definition of
FFs presents a three-fold solution to the challenges above, i.e.,
it uses the three common characteristics (from §II-B) of the
attacker actions (behavior) observed in past attacks as three
separate class of FFs. Each attack behavior is represented by
a set of events and its corresponding attack stages as its input
(i.e., Ec and Sc above). Although these variables define a large
combinatorial space, PULSAR focuses only on observations
that are (a) highly frequent in a past attack, and (b) statistically
significant, so that the observation reliably indicates an attack.
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We capture the frequency of a sequence of events Ec and
attack-stages Sc in a function q(Ec,Sc) such that
q(Ec,Sc) =
{
P(Ec,Sc), if Ec is obs. in the cur. attack
0, otherwise
(2)
where P(Ec,Sc) is the probability of observing Ec having
states Sc in the training dataset D. We capture the statisti-
cal significance of the event- and attack-stage–sequence by
computing the significance level p(Ec,Sc) (i.e., p-value: the
probability that the null-hypothesis is true) of observing Ec, Sc
under the null-hypothesis that “the target system is currently
not under attack”. To combine both frequent and significant
characteristics, PULSAR uses exponential form FFs, i.e.,
f (Ec,Sc) = exp{q(Ec,Sc)(1− p(Ec,Sc))}. (3)
The advantages of this exponential form are that (a) it
achieves numerical stability for small values of q(Xc) and
p(Xc) (especially when attacks are rare events), and (b) it
ensures that the product of FFs is a convex function. Convex-
exponential FFs allow us to efficiently optimize the joint pdf
in our learning and inference steps by using the log-sum-
exp trick. For notational simplification, we use the shorthand
pc = p(Ec,Sc) and qc = q(Ec,Sc).
PULSAR maps the problem of learning FFs into finding the
parameters pc using patterns from past security incidents to
capture three characteristics of APTs: commonality, severity,
and repetitiveness. PULSAR utilizes an ensemble of generic
statistical hypothesis testing frameworks [62], each of which
is customized for the properties mentioned above. Only the
FFs which have a high significance (pc ≤ 0.05), i.e., that
observing the properties under the null hypothesis is unlikely)
are considered for use in (1).
The FFs are trained from an annotated dataset of past
attacks D = {Ai 7→ [E it ,Sit ,U it ]|∀i} which consists of a set of
attacks Ai, each of which includes an event timeline E it , an
annotated attack stage timeline Sit , and an ownership map
U it = {u j | j ∈ [0, t] ∧ u j owns e jinE ij} which identifies which
user is responsible for which event. In addition, we have a list
U which identifies the malicious users in each scenario. Using
this formalism of the input dataset, we consider the training
procedure of each of the FFs presented above as follows.
The Severity FF. Severity FFs measure the maliciousness of
an event. We consider an event malicious when an attacker has
taken control of the system or has caused significant damage.
It can be argued that traditional signature-based TDS (e.g., [6])
are a degenerate (non-probabilistic) case of the severity FF.
Hence, in the case of severity FFs, Ec = {e} and Sc = {s}. To
understand the occurrence of an event e in D we compute two
probabilities PA,s(e), the probability of an event being from
attack stage s, and PB(e), the probability of an event being
benign. So
pSeverity(e,s) = χ2
({
PA,s(e)
∑x PA,s(x)+PB(x)
,
∑x PA,s(x)−PA,s(e)
∑x PA,s(x)+PB(x)
}
,
{
PB(e)
∑x PA,s(x)+PB(x)
,
∑x PB(x)−PB(e)
∑x PA,s(x)+PB(x)
})
, (4)
where χ2(·) represents the p-value of the chi-squared test [62].
This test is applicable for testing dependencies of categorical
variables, i.e., dependency between the observed events and
the attack stage. In the training phase, the value of p(e,s) for
all statistically significant combinations of e and s is computed
offline and stored for use at inference.
The Commonality FF. Commonality FFs measure the
similarity between a sequence of events observed during an
attack and all past known attacks. Thus, conventional similarity
measures, such as Hamming distance or string similarity, are
not suitable. To capture the aforementioned characteristics, we
quantify similarity using the longest common subsequence
(LCS) measure [29], [63] which outputs a sequence of events
that appear in the same order in two attacks. This LCS approach
works with mimicry attacks in which attackers inject arbitrary
noise to the event sequence. Note that attackers may not simply
change the order of events to trick our approach, because many
events depend on each other, e.g., executing the binary file of
a memory exploit first requires the successful compilation of
the exploit from the source code.
In the training phase, the LCS Li, j is computed for all pairs
(Ai,A j) (such that i 6= j) of attacks in D. Each unique value of
Li, j has an annotated attack stage Si, j. The commonality FF’s
pc is calculated as
pCommon(Li, j,Si, j) = F
({
PA,Si, j(Li, j)
∑x PA,Si, j(x)+PB(x)
,
∑x PA,Si, j(x)−PA,Si, j(Li, j)
∑x PA,Si, j(x)+PB(x)
}
,
{
PB(Li, j)
∑x PA,Si, j(x)+PB(x)
,
∑x PB(x)−PB(Li, j)
∑x PA,Si, j(x)+PB(x)
})
, (5)
where F(·) is the p-value of the Fisher exact test [62] and PA,Si, j
and PB are defined as above. We test for significance of the
LCS by using this test on a small sample size, e.g., a limited
observation of attacks, as malicious attacks are rare compared
to legitimate activities in our data source. All statistically
significant combinations of Li, j, Si, j and p(Li, j,Si, j) are stored
for use at inference.
The Repetitiveness FF. A repetitiveness FF measures the
periodicity of an event. Regular events occurring in a regular
period are often results of the repeated execution [64] of
automated scripts and hence can be used as an indicator of
automated attacks at an early stage (e.g., periodic port scan
events [65], [66]).
For every event e which is annotated with attack stage s in
an attack Ai, PULSAR computes a the frequency H
(i)
s,e,n,k of
occurrence (i.e., number of repetitions) of (e,s) in the time
interval [nk,(n+1)k] during the attack Ai. Then
pRepetitive(e,s) = min
i,n,k
DW
({
H(i)s,e,n,k|Ai ∈D
})
, (6)
where DW(·) is the p-value of the Durbin-Watson test [62].
These DW tests are computed in training. The statistically
significant repetitive events are stored for use in inference.
All three FFs above are generated by statistical tests based
on the counts of past events. Thus, when a new attack is
observed, PULSAR does not need to re-learn the FFs. Instead,
it increments the frequency of the events sequences (according
to the events in the new attack) and reruns the statistical tests
above. This notion of incremental training proposition is useful
6
Algorithm 1: Construction and inference on FG
Input : Set of learned factor functions F ,
An event timeline Et up to a time t
Output : Sequence of attack stages ŝt ,
Action ât ∈A
1 FG ←∅
2 ∆ ← 0.05
3 for ei ∈ Et do
4 add an event node ei to the FG
5 add an attack stage node si to the FG
6 add a transition FF between si and si−1
7 for f ∈ F do
8 if q f > 0 and p f ≤ ∆) then // select a ff
9 add the factor function f to the FG
10 end
11 end
12 end
13 ŝt ← T RW (P(Et ,St) // using Tree Reweighted to find argmaxst
14 ât ← argmaxa∑i∈S P(ŝt = i)×u(a, i)
15 return (ŝt , ât)
for systems that observe new attacks on a daily basis. For
attacks that introduce new events, we discuss them in §VII.
Constructing FGs. At runtime, the FG only contains an
event et and an unknown stage st . PULSAR selects FFs (from
the learned FFs above) that are statistically significant and adds
these FF to the FG to connect et and st . When a new event
et+1 is observed, the above procedure is repeated. In addition,
PULSAR adds a transition FF: f (st ,st+1) that captures the
probability that a stage st leads to a stage st+1. This probability
is represented by a 11×11 matrix. Finally, PULSAR performs
inference on unknown attack stages.
C. Inference On Factor Graphs
PULSAR uses the constructed FG above and its inference
algorithm (see Algorithm 1) to predict the sequence of unknown
attack stages St associated with a sequence of observed events
E up to a time t. Based on how an analyst responds to an
attack at SystemX, we consider a three-tiered decision model
(see Table II) that separates actions from their implementations,
which might be system dependent. Based on that estimate
of St , a preemptive action at (e.g., no-operation, monitor
a user closely–via deep packet inspection, or stop the user
immediately) is suggested to an analyst.
PULSAR’s inference procedure finds the most probable
attack stages that minimize the energy [67] of the FGs. Since
our FG can have loops (two variables may be connected by
more than one factor function), loopy BP does not guarantee
convergence: the inferred attack stages may reach the global
minimum energy of the FG. Therefore, we adopted the
sequential tree-reweighted (TRW) message passing scheme [68]
that: i) decomposes the loopy FG into smaller FGs without a
loop, ii) guarantees that the inference procedure will converge.
Using TRW, PULSAR infers a maximum likelihood estimate
(MLE) for a sequence of unknown attack stages Ŝt (up to time
t) associated with an event timeline Et . Further, it outputs a
confidence level for each stage, as an event is observed. That
means finding Ŝt = argmaxS P(Et ,S), where P(Et ,S) is defined
using the factorization equation (§IV) in FGs. The result of
this optimization procedure is the most likely sequence of
attack stages associated with observed events. This procedure
provides the step-by-step estimate of attack stages for analysts.
Table II: List of preemptive actions in the PULSAR reward
model (see Fig. 6).
Action Description
α1 Benign user behavior, no immediate action needs to be performed.
α2 An attack may be in progress, and further monitoring is required.
α3 An attack is imminent and must be stopped immediately.
σ0 σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 σ5 σ6 σ7 σ8 σ9 σ10stage
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
re
wa
rd
noop monitor stop
Figure 6: Reward function u(a,s) for each attack stage.
Algorithm 2: Computing the reward function u(a,s).
Input : Training data D of size n×11,
Priors µp = {µa|a ∈A}, and Σp = {Σa|a ∈A}
Output : Reward function u(a,s)
/* Definition: GMM(x|k,µ,Σ) = ∑ki=1 wi×N(x|µi,Σi) */
1 w,µ,Σ← EM(D,k,µp,Σp) // Train k = 3 GMM model
2 u←∅
3 for a ∈A do // Corresponding to {α1,α2,α3}
4 for s ∈ [0,10] do // Corresponding to {σ0, . . . ,σ10}
5 u(a,s)← wa×N(I11[s, :]| µa,Σa)
6 end
7 end
8 return u
D. Decision on maliciousness of an attack
The FG model is extended with “reward factor functions”
to produce a decision model that determines an optimal action
based on the inferred attack stage (see Fig. 5) to support
learning [69]. The decision model has two new components:
1) a finite action space A = {α1,α2,α3} (see Table II), and
2) a reward function u :A×S→R. The output of the decision
model allows security analysts to closely track the progress
of an ongoing attack and implement response strategies. The
decision model is useful when PULSAR is not confident in its
inferred attack stage (i.e., the prediction probability is close
to 50%). In this case, a monitor action (α2) is recommended
instead of immediately stopping user activity, which would
otherwise lead to FPs. At time t, the decision model uses the
inferred attack stage ŝt , and its probability P(ŝt), to choose an
action ât that maximizes the reward over P(ŝt) in §IV-D.
To model a mapping from attack stages (obtained from
FG’s inference) to three actions that analysts at SystemX
do, we use a 3-component Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM;
corresponding to the 3 actions described in Table II) with priors
to construct the reward functions. Gaussian has a conjugate
prior distribution that augments these functions with operational
information about past incidents, i.e., actions that SystemX’s
security team has taken in past incidents. A reward function
u(a,s) (see Fig. 6) on an action a being taken at stage s is
estimated over a 11-D space (corresponding the attack stages
σ0, . . . ,σ10). Each of the components (clusters) in the GMM
corresponds to one of the actions {α1,α2,α3}. For example, in
the early attack stages σ0,σ1, the no-op action α1 is preferred.
In the intermediate stages σ2,σ3, the monitor action α2 (i.e.,
deep packet inspection) is preferred. Finally, in attack stages
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Figure 7: Testbest architecture for evaluating PULSAR.
Table III: Summary of dataset used in our experiments.
Description Past Unseen Production
Total events 235K 1.25M 4.9M
Unique events 105 68 42
Number of APTs 120 10 –
Type of APTs Known Unseen Attempted
Data duration 10 years 1 week 1 month
σ4, . . . ,σ10, the stop action α3 has a higher reward than α1 &
α2. The training procedure (using expectation maximization)
is described in §IV-D.
V. EVALUATION SETUP
Real-world APTs blend their attack events with background
activities of legitimate users running production workload. The
question is whether PULSAR can identify real APTs in a timely
manner. We demonstrate PULSAR’s accuracy and performance
via three experiments. First, we evaluated PULSAR on 120
past APTs retrospectively. Second, we evaluated PULSAR’s
detectability on ten unseen attacks constructed using the IBM
Threat Intelligence Index and injected in live traffic where
normal security events were intermingled with the unseen
attack events. Third, PULSAR was integrated into SystemX’s
security infrastructure, for a month-long trial, while measuring
its performance overhead.
Experiment 1: Evaluation based on successful past APTs.
To provide a baseline estimation of the accuracy of PULSAR
in correctly detecting past APTs, data on 120 past APTs is
divided into two disjoint sets: (i) a set of 60 attacks (2008–
2009) for training PULSAR’s factor functions and (ii) a set of
60 attacks (2010–present) for evaluating PULSAR’s accuracy
in detecting the past APTs1.
Experiment 2: Evaluation based on APTs unseen at
SystemX. To test the efficacy of PULSAR in detecting attacks
never observed in SystemX, we reconstructed and replayed ten
attack scenarios (described in Table IV). For this, we studied the
mechanisms of high-profile attacks [5], [70] (e.g., the Equifax
data breach [11]) and reconstructed attack scenarios using
top ten attack techniques from the IBM Threat Intelligence
Index [2]. These attack scenarios use different techniques, such
as local privilege escalation in A2, A8 and remote exploit in
A1, A6; a custom rootkit in A1; a custom backdoor in A4;
and custom exploits in A9, A10. None of these attacks have
been observed in the past at SystemX.
The attack scenarios in Table IV represent major data
breaches [11], credential stealing [70], and system integrity
violations (e.g., escaping from the isolation mechanism of
1SystemX has observed fewer attacks in recent years than before 2010 because of
improved security policies and authentication systems.
TOKENknown_host
/bin/sh
ssh
#shflask.py *cat ping
iodine
tar
Figure 8: An example sophisticated scenario (A2) that uses a
coordinated DDoS attack and an OAuth bypass exploit.
Linux containers). Thus, they show both the depth (in terms
of sophistication) and the breath (in terms of the variety of
techniques) of APTs. The attack scenarios were in live traffic
during production workloads at SystemX; thus, it is not possible
to precisely characterize the similarity between the scenarios
and past APTs.
Because of space constraints, we describe just one sophisti-
cated attack scenario (A2) that attempts to manipulate security
monitors. In A2, the attacker ran a mimicry attack against a
Python flask server that authenticates users using a vulnerable
pysaml2 library (Fig. 8). To mislead security analysts and blend
the real exploit into legitimate activities, the attacker attempted
to flood Bro by launching hundreds of legitimate-looking
requests to the flask server and other servers. In this case, Bro
did not have a signature of the exploit (OAuth bypass [71]),
and thus, allowed the attacker to access the vulnerable flask
server. PULSAR, however, received the following events from
Bro and the host monitors: i) intermittent packet capture losses
while production workloads were not high; ii) accessing a
list of internal hosts (known_host file); and iii) unscheduled
internal network scans. Combining above events, PULSAR
recognized and stopped this attack at the lateral movement (σ7)
in which the attacker was attempting to access other hosts.
Accurate reconstruction and replay of such attack scenarios,
however, presents several challenges.
Challenge 1. The emulated attack scenarios must include
background traffic (i.e., legitimate user activities and back-
ground noise such as legitimate port scans) in order to be
realistic. Fig. 7 shows the experimental setup used to collect
both types of traffic. Each attack scenario was setup in
a vulnerable server (i.e., one that contained software with
a known vulnerability) alongside SystemX’s workstations,
servers, an OpenStack cloud, and a Kubernetes cluster. We
simulated a remote attacker accessing the system through the
WAN connection to exploit the vulnerable servers in the attack
scenarios. Network flows in/out of SystemX (with an average
of 12Gbps and a maximum of 40Gbps) were captured via a
network tap device at the network border by a Bro cluster of
16 nodes to output network events. Host logs were captured
via host-auditing tools and collected via rsyslog to output
host events. Both host and network events were collected for
preprocessing and analysis by PULSAR. The events were
filtered into logical channels. Each channel was a stream of
events that was associated with a user. PULSAR subscribed
to each channel and constructed a per-user FG, and inferred
attack stages/decisions at runtime.
Challenge 2. The volume of events generated by monitoring
tools in the production system is quite significant and it is
possible for attack events to be hidden in this large volume of
events. Fig. 1 shows that the test environment experiences a
daily average of 94,238 events for a total of 2,032 registered
users (at peak times: no more than half of the users use the
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Table IV: Ten representative APTs that use top-10 and representative attack vectors from the IBM Threat Intelligence Index [2].
ID Name Description Common events with past attacks
A1 Port knocking Exploit a remote code execution vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 in an Apache
Struts web server and read a database of personal information.
Network scan, get kernel version, access mem
disk, compile, new kernel module.
A2 DDoS and
OAuth
Flood network monitors with a high-volume stream of benign-looking requests,
forcing the monitor to drop packets. Concurrently, attackers exploit an auth.
bypass bug CVE-2017-1000433 in the pysaml2 library to steal access tokens.
High network flows, packet loss, access
known_host file, scan internal servers, exces-
sive POST req.
A3 Container Es-
cape
Exploit a heap vulnerability CVE-2017-5123 on a Kubernetes cluster to read
SSH keys in hosted containers.
Get kernel version, compilation, access
id_rsa file.
A4 SSH
Keylogger
Deploy an SSH keylogger into an OpenSSH server, to record credentials of
subsequent user logins.
Concurrent login, compilation, restart system
service, unknown SSH client.
A5 Ransomware Spread ransomware that uses CVE-2017-0144. The ransomware registers itself
as a system service to scan for and steal secret files.
New sys. service, scan internal SMB servers,
transfer .exe files via SMB.
A6 Shellshock Exploit CVE-2014-6271 and setup DNS tunnels to exfiltrate stolen data. packet loss, get kernel version, access
/etc/password, excessive DNS reqs.
A7 CPU Bug Exploit a local privilege escalation vulnerability CVE-2017-5754 to steal source
code files and extract passwords in the Firefox browser [72].
Get kernel version, get source code file,
compile, excessive POST requests.
A8 VM Escape Exploit a Virtual Box vulnerability CVE-2018-2676 to control the host machine
and extract private GPG keys.
Access mem disk, compile, access
secring.gpg, excessive UDP requests.
A9 Race
Condition
Exploit a race condition in a digital wallet platform to steal the private key. High network flows, access privkey.pem,
excessive ICMP requests.
A10 Obj Deserial-
ization
Exploit an object deserialization vulnerability in the Python pickle module to
steal private TLS keys.
Sensitive commands in HTTP request, access
privkey.pem.
system concurrently). Although PULSAR processes events as
they arrive, it filters out insignificant events by only adding
statistically significant (identified by a low p-value) factor
functions. Such filtering significantly reduces the number of
events in both our training and testing data. PULSAR filtered
this stream of an average of 94,238 events to an average
of 1,885 significant events that it performed inference. Thus,
PULSAR is robust to spurious or noisy events, e.g., ones
triggered by benign user activities.
Challenge 3. Malware or malicious traffic can proliferate
out of control [73]. To ensure full control over the replayed
attack scenarios, we contained each attack in a Linux container
and further encapsulated it in a virtual machine with limited
capabilities. All containers used in our experiments ran in a
network sandbox that implemented a Layer-3 private overlay
network on a separated Classless Inter-Domain Routing block.
Challenge 4. Reproducing old, vulnerabilities is challenging
because new Linux distributions already patch old ones out
of the box. For example, to reproduce the Container Escape
vulnerability, one would have to obtain not only an old Linux
distribution released just before the vulnerability announcement
date, but also all dependent package repositories. To address
this issue, we built a tool to create old Linux containers at
any point in the past (2005–present) using the Debian Linux
snapshot repository. This tool allows us to reproduce network-
based attack scenarios that include i) a vulnerable server
container with an unpatched kernel, user applications, and their
dependencies; and ii) an attack container with corresponding
exploits (e.g., ICMP tunneling tools). Thus, our approach is
more extensible than Metasploit, which only provides exploit
code, or a tool introduced in [74], which only provides scenarios
for memory error vulnerabilities on the host.
With the above challenges solved, we created a testbed
environment for automated replay of APTs in production. The
data collected from the replayed APTs were used to measure
the accuracy and preemption capabilities of PULSAR.
Accuracy measurement. We compared PULSAR’s accuracy
in detecting the ten unseen APTs with that of the event from
any monitor (EA), event correlation (EC), and event statistical
anomaly (ES) techniques currently deployed at SystemX. The
EA method is a degenerate approach in which every event is
declared to be an attack. The EC is implemented using Bro
and osquery [75]; it relies on i) an extensive signature database
aggregated from more than 30 anti-virus vendors [76]) and ii)
manually created correlation rules, e.g., a brute-force SSH login
followed by a successful root login, based on host/network
event types (similar to the alert correlation technique in [77]).
The ES includes a set of statistical measures (similar to ones
in [78], [79]) calculated from the outputs of the deployed
security monitors, e.g., days since last login.
Experiment 3: Performance and accuracy of PULSAR
in production at SystemX. To validate PULSAR’s runtime
performance in the production network while real workloads
were running, we deployed PULSAR in SystemX for one
month and measured its memory consumption, event processing
latency, and observed its decisions.
To determine the performance impact of PULSAR on the
regular workload, we measured i) runtime memory used
by PULSAR, and ii) the latency of PULSAR’s algorithms
(implemented as a single but multithreaded process based on
a C++ OpenGM framework [80]). All measurements were run
in a single 56-core 2 GHz Intel Xeon E5 with 128GB RAM.
VI. RESULTS
This section presents the results of the experiments above.
Result 1: Evaluation based on data on successful past
APTs. Fig. 9 shows PULSAR’s attack stage detection accuracy
in terms of the F-measure of the precision-recall spectra.
F-measure is the 2-times harmonic mean of precision and
recall, is upper-bounded by 1, and maps directly to the
effectiveness of PULSAR, with larger numbers signifying
better accuracy. The F-measure range is [63.3%,98.9%] with an
average accuracy of attack stage detection of 93.5%. PULSAR
shows lower effectiveness in accurately identifying attack
stages corresponding to the attack preparation phase (σ6 was
accurately detected only 63.3% of the time). The reason for the
lower accuracy is that many events (e.g., download) generated
at the preparation stage overlap with legitimate user activities.
For example, a code download frequently corresponds to a
legitimate user activity). At SystemX, we have observed that
89% of users who perform file downloads are legitimate.
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Figure 9: Attack stage detection accuracy in past APTs. Dotted
contour lines represent the F-measure of the precision-recall
spectra. The majority of detected attack stages are clustered
close to F-measure= 1, i.e., better precision-recall.
Even so, PULSAR detected 55 out of 60 attacks and
performed the best in detecting the benign stage σ0 (which
it did 98.9% of the time with a low FPR) and the gathering
stage σ3 (which it did 92.0% of the time – showing that it
could preempt attacks before system integrity violation).
Result 2: Evaluation based on data on ten unseen attacks
injected in live traffic at SystemX. PULSAR’s accuracy in
detecting attack stages in the ten unseen attacks is quantified
in Fig. 10 in comparison with the three methods (described
in §V) currently deployed in SystemX. First, we studied the
true-positive rate (TPR), which is representative of the overall
accuracy of the PULSAR system in correctly identifying APTs.
Fig. 10 shows that PULSAR significantly outperforms the EC
and ES techniques (§V). The TPR for PULSAR is 84.8%,
while it is 18.4% and 11.4% for EC and ES, respectively. The
EA has 100% accuracy because it indicates an APT for any
observed event. Second, we studied the false-positive rate (FPR)
which was representative of the number of events generated by
legitimate users but detected as attacks. The FPR is important
from a security administrator perspective, as a high FPR can
overwhelm a human operator’s ability to react to an attack
quickly. We observe (from Fig. 10) that the EC offers a near-
zero FPR (which is expected, because EC matches specific
event patterns) and that the ES performs poorly on the FPR (the
EA has a 99.7% FPR because all events, including ones from
legitimate users, are considered attacks). PULSAR’s small
but non-zero FPR (0.02%) can be attributed to production
traffic that interleaves with attack-related activities when we
replay a given attack. This traffic adds noise to the stream
of events observed by PULSAR. In the context of TPR and
FPR, PULSAR offers a trade-off between high attack detection
accuracy and a low FPR.
PULSAR preempts attacks and does not need to be informed
by monitors of severe events (at the end of attacks). Table V
summarizes the effectiveness of the four methods (compared in
this analysis) in terms of two metrics: (i) preemption of system
integrity violation and data loss (SI+DL) and (ii) preemption
of data loss while allowing integrity violation (DL). The third
column in Table V shows the median number of stages (hops)
that each method is able to detect the attack before system
integrity violation. The last column in Table V shows the FPR
when we evaluated PULSAR on ten unseen scenarios ran in
live production traffic that produced a total of 1.25M events
(Table III). The EC has a low FPR (0.051%), however, it
preempts only one attack out of ten before system integrity
violation. Although PULSAR could not stop all system integrity
violations, it was able to stop eight attacks out of ten at least
Event from
Any Monitor
Event
Correlation
Event Statistical
Anomaly
PULSAR
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
tpr
fpr
Figure 10: TPR and FPR of the techniques across attack stages.
The boxes represent quartiles; the notch represents the median,
and the whiskers represent the maximum and minimum.
Table V: Summary of an early detection result for ten attacks
Method Median hop SI+DL DL False Positive
EA 4 10 10 99.706%
EC 1 1 2 00.051%
ES 0 0 3 00.040%
PULSAR 3 8 10 00.020%
SI: System integrity violation; DL: Data loss
SI+DL: Attacks stopped before SI and DL
DL: Attacks stopped after SI but before DL
one hop before system integrity violation without needing to
observe of any critical event (e.g., installation of a kernel
module) from underlying monitors. In addition, PULSAR
stopped all ten attacks up to three stages (in the median case)
before data loss. PULSAR has the lowest FPR (i.e., fraction
of events incorrectly classified as attacks), 0.020%, which is
2× better than that of the second-best method (i.e., 0.040% in
ES).
Result 3: Evaluation based on data from PULSAR
deployment in the production SystemX. A key performance
metric for characterizing PULSAR deployment in the produc-
tion environment is the observed FPR, in terms of both the
percentage and the absolute number of false alerts [7]. Given
increasing amounts of network traffic and host activities, even
a small FPR can quickly overwhelm a security analyst’s ability
to react to an attack. We tested PULSAR in a production
environment in which attack traffic was naturally interleaved
with legitimate user activities, i.e., background network traffic
and host activities, making detection significantly more difficult.
Table VI shows the list of the top 5 most/least frequent events.
Even under those noisy operational conditions, PULSAR had
an impressive FPR of 0.009%, which corresponds to an average
of nine false detections out of an average of 94K daily events.
Three out of nine false detections were correlated with three
known malicious downloads (shown in Table VI), in which
malicious files (e.g., discussed in [81], [82]) were downloaded
because of user mistakes, but none of those malicious files was
executed. The remaining six out of nine false detections were
related to Apache Struts exploit attempts followed by unusual
host activities (e.g., disabling of Bash history logging).
Runtime Performance. Since SystemX has hundreds of
active users a day, we configured PULSAR to handle at most
1,000 concurrent users with a sliding window size of 10,000
events per user. The window size must be long enough to
accommodate long-duration APTs [5]. In this configuration,
PULSAR can handle events for APTs that last up to 217
days (10,000 events/46 events per day for a user), assuming 46 events per
user per day as calculated in§V. PULSAR takes a median
of 1.06 seconds (variance = 0.03) from observing an event to
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Table VI: Listing of top 5 most frequent and least frequent
alerts during a one-month deployment in production (2018).
Count Service Name Description/Example
145.9K SSH Subnet_Scanner Scan for SSH hosts
133.8K SSL Invalid_Cert Invalid server certificate
23.4K HTTP Struts Exploit Apache Struts
1.9K DNS Excessive Large outgoing DNS requests
1.8K HTTP Shellshock Attempt to exploit Bash
175 RDP Brute Force Remote desktop login
93 ARP Unknown_Host New host on internal network
39 HTTP Exposed An internal server is exposed
36 HTTP SQL_Injection Inject SQL commands
3 HTTP Bad_Download A known malicious file
making a decision (Fig. 11), which is well within the 31-minute
inter-event arrival rate of events for each user in SystemX (as
calculated in §V). PULSAR requires only 126MiB of memory
for each monitored user (i.e., 126GiB of memory for the
production deployment of 1,000 users; see Fig. 11).
The PULSAR algorithm’s scales as O(n), where n the
number of nodes (which includes the numbers of observed
events, unknown states, and actions) and the number of FFs
(which is fixed from the training data and does not change at
runtime) in the graph [33]. PULSAR is currently implemented
as a single process, and this limits the number of users that
PULSAR can handle at the same time (1000). PULSAR can
leverage [83] to scale to a larger number of users.
VII. DISCUSSION
Explaining PULSAR’s success. As we pointed out in our
threat model (§III), the success of our approach depends on
some overlaps between unseen APTs and past APTs. As
we have shown in our results (§VI), PULSAR has learned
prior knowledge (in terms of commonality, severity, and
repetitiveness FFs) from a broad set of 120 past APTs. In fact,
each unseen attack (in our ten scenarios shown in Table IV)
has an average of six key events (not counting excessive scan
events) out of a maximum of 30 events and a minimum of 12
events that are common with past APTs. This relatively modest
level of similarity with past events enables PULSAR to detect
unseen attacks. It is important to note that the training data
had only thousands of events, while PULSAR in production
observed millions of background events. This means the number
of attacks (albeit many unsuccessful) has increased significantly.
Generalizing PULSAR trained knowledge to other sys-
tems. A pre-trained instance of PULSAR (e.g., based on data
from SystemX) can be ported to another system under two
assumptions: the new system uses industry-standard monitors
such as Bro to output events that have the same semantics as
in E and a similar number of users. The assumptions reflect
a limitation of the current PULSAR implementation, not its
inference algorithm. While a new environment might have new
events that are not in our defined event set E, incorporating
such new events into PULSAR would not require a retraining
of the old FFs. Instead, only new FFs that are related to the
new events need to be learned and used for inference.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The signature-based techniques (SBTs) [6], [10], [84]–[87]
identify specific hashes of attack payloads. Hence, they are
suitable only for identifying a specific stage of an attack (such
as the use of a known rootkit at a late attack stage). They are
not suitable for preemptive detection of APTs because each
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Figure 11: Memory and latency performance of PULSAR for
10,100,1000 users with a varying size of window of events.
stage may look benign when analyzed in isolation, but together
they show malicious intent (e.g., see §II-C). The anomaly-
based techniques (ABTs) [19], [20], [88]–[102] construct a
normal usage profile from past training data and measure a
statistical distance to find anomalous usage profiles at runtime.
As a result, potentially novel attacks can be captured, but at the
cost of a high number of false detection [103]. Thus, security
operators must select anomaly features carefully.
Detection models based on PGMs [104]–[107] have been
built based on expert-defined libraries of known attacks. Thus,
the detection accuracy is often proportional to the manual
work involved in creating features. Alert correlation [75], [77]
and data provenance [108], [109] techniques combine related
events of the same attack instance into a stream of events.
However, for large-scale systems, hundreds of events occur
concurrently, so simply filtering and ordering events do not
work. Attack graph techniques [110]–[115] illustrate possible
attack scenarios, so they are useful for system administrators
in deploying appropriate security monitors to defend their
systems. The common problem across ML techniques [112],
[116]–[119], however, is that they have been trained on
outdated [120] or synthetic datasets that contain artificial
background traffic. Some attack detection techniques in [19],
[121] only consider host-level events. Forensic analyses [122]–
[130] localize compromised hosts post-incident, e.g., using
post-compromise communication traces [131], therefore, they
are not suitable for preemptive detection. Overall, it is unclear
whether these solutions can be successful in preempting APTs.
Applying ML and security presents several challenges [132].
First, while some ML models offer low FPR (e.g., 0.1%),
these models suffer from high FPR for large-scale deployment
(e.g., a million security events per day × 0.1% = 1,000
false alerts per day). PULSAR lowers the FPR by only using
statistically significance FFs learned from our real-world study
of 120 APTs, thus compensating for the shortcomings of
IDSs [133]. In the future, it will likely be beneficial to deploy
PULSAR on smart IDSs [134]. Second, while existing work
uses outdated [120], [135], short-term [136], or limited variety
of attack type datasets [137], [138], our source training data
are longitudinal (representing 10-year) and have been collected
in real production traffic with up-to-date attack activities
(until 2018). Third, while deep-learning models, e.g., [90],
are promising, they offer analysts few explanations on how the
models work. In contrast, PULSAR clearly shows the evolution
of each attack stage; thereby enabling APTs response.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper presented PULSAR, a preemptive intrusion de-
tection and response framework for the detection of Advanced
Persistent Threats. PULSAR has been deployed at SystemX
and demonstrated accurate attack preemption with a low FPR.
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